

# THE STRUCTURAL BLIND SPOT

*Institutional conflict of interest and individual responsibility:  
causes of the systematic absence of scientific literature  
on an aspect of primary democratic and juridical relevance.*

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## **Abstract**

*The present work formulates and argues a specific scientific anomaly: the near-total absence, in the academic literature of the last eighty years, of critical analyses of the duration of appointments in the structure of public employment as a primary democratic variable. It is demonstrated that this absence is neither accidental nor due to the irrelevance of the problem, but is the predictable consequence of three converging mechanisms: a structural conflict of interest that shapes the research agenda; a selection of public personnel oriented toward conformity rather than democratic and republican sensibility; an individual awareness that cannot be entirely annulled by the structure, thereby grounding a personal responsibility alongside the systemic one. The advent of synthetic intelligence renders inevitable today the dismissal of a large part of personnel in public functions, including academic ones. The interpretive framework of the Republic of Fulfilled Meaning offers the ethical and democratic justification, historically coherent, for governing this transition in a legitimate manner. The whole converges toward new measurement instruments: the Unique Indicator of Democracy and the Social Harmony Index, developed by the Author within the framework of the thirty-year activity of the Laboratorio Eudemonia.*

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## **1. Introduction: An Absence That Requires Explanation**

There exists a structural feature that characterises the near-totality of contemporary societies we call democratic: the de facto immovability of personnel in non-legislative public functions. Judges, administrative employees, healthcare workers, university lecturers, fiscal officials — the operational mass of the public structure, from the first to the last employee — occupy their functions without any effective temporal limit, without any democratic majority being able to remove them, without any citizen being able to aspire to replace them for as long as they are alive and in service. And yet this feature is not marginal: it determines who exercises real power, who controls collective resources, who shapes the next generations.

An observer external to the scientific circuits would expect this variable — the temporal structure of public employment — to be the object of broad, rigorous and continuous comparative research. From the eighty years elapsed since the post-war democratic reconstruction, one would expect studies comparing systems with different degrees of institutional rotation, studies relating the temporariness of legislative roles to the immovability of functional roles, theories analysing the effects of the temporal monopoly of public careers as a form of systematic exclusion and therefore its structural incompatibility with democratic participation.

Literature exists on adjacent phenomena — bureaucratic politicisation, institutional corruption, the accountability of the public official, the relationship between career structure and organisational performance — but no line of research specifically identifies the immovability of public employment roles as a primary variable in the founding of a Republic, relating it directly and comparatively to the exclusionary effects it produces and the consequences of systemic inefficiency. The great archives of worldwide academic production, today accessible to all, show that the temporal structure of public apparatuses is surrounded by research without ever having been at its centre. The correct scientific question is not whether the theme is irrelevant: it is why systematic research on it has never been produced. The answer, as will be argued, is structurally predictable and, at a further level, individually responsible.

## **2. Three Converging Mechanisms**

### **2.1 The Structural Conflict of Interest**

Standard economic theory predicts that rational agents will not produce information that damages their own material interests if they can avoid it without sanction. This principle is applied systematically in the evaluation of research funded by the pharmaceutical, oil, and tobacco industries. In those cases, the scientific community recognises without difficulty that the funder shapes the research agenda.

The same principle applies, with equal logical rigour, to academic research on public employment. The university researcher is, in the near-totality of countries that define

themselves as democratic, a permanent public employee or a precarious one aspiring to become so. Their salary, career progression, and pension depend on the permanence of the system of permanent public employment. Producing research that demonstrates the structural dysfunctionality of that system would be equivalent to producing research against one's own primary economic interest.

The prediction that follows is formally simple and falsifiable:

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**P<sub>1</sub>: In a system in which researchers are permanent public employees, critical research on the permanent structure of public employment will be systematically under-represented relative to its social relevance.**

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This prediction is falsifiable: it is sufficient to demonstrate the existence of a systematic, cumulative and mainstream literature on this topic to refute it. As emerges in the following section, such a demonstration is not available.

Institutional incentives shape the research agenda without any single agent having to make explicitly dishonest choices. A researcher who considers working on the structural reform of public employment faces: difficulty of funding, editorial resistance from referees with the same interests, reputational risk, and the absence of a reference community that accumulates results. That line of research is not explored not because anyone forbids it, but because the incentive system renders it rationally inconvenient for anyone operating within it. This mechanism has a precise name: cognitive capture. The institution that should be examined by research ends up conditioning the research itself.

## **2.2 Conformity-Oriented Selection**

The second mechanism operates upstream: the systems of access to public functions, in their current form, do not select for civic sensibility, capacity for autonomous judgement, or vocation for collective service. They select predominantly for mnemonic capacity, procedural conformity and aspiration to a permanent position — the cognitive and motivational traits most functional to the reproduction of a system that seeks to be immutable.

This is not a generic moral judgement: it is a verifiable structural prediction. A system that rewards conformity tends, over time, to produce an institutional population that values hierarchy, the stability of its own position and vertical dependence — exactly the psychological profile functional to the perpetuation of a closed system. And since this selection does not occur only upon entry but repeats itself throughout the duration of the career, through advancement mechanisms that reward those who do not question the structure, the result over time is a progressive convergence toward homologation: the system becomes ever more similar to itself, ever less capable of tolerating within itself those who observe it critically.

To this is added a further phenomenon: artificial complexity as an instrument of power. A permanent bureaucratic system has a structural incentive to produce

opacity — to render its functions apparently unexecutable by anyone who has not spent decades within it. If the system is comprehensible, anyone can enter and replace those who reside in it. If it is rendered opaque, immovability becomes a functional necessity in the eyes of all, including elected governors. It is for this reason that bureaucratic reforms almost always produce more bureaucracy, not less: those who design them are internal to the system and have every interest in reforming without simplifying.

The objective of a healthy society is the opposite: to maintain issues and the entire system at a level of broad usability that does not annihilate common sense and does not stray beyond the field of natural comprehensibility. Precisely because this is an eminently humanistic domain — not nuclear engineering but the management of the common thing — it is possible and necessary that anyone, endowed with the qualifications required for the role and level, can enter a public function, replace whoever is missing for any reason, and not degrade, indeed even improve, the final product. A system that requires decades of apprenticeship to perform ordinary functions of public service is by definition a system that has produced artificial complexity to protect occupied positions.

### **2.3 Individual Responsibility: Beyond Structural Determinism**

The third element of the analysis is the most delicate to formulate with precision, but it is the one that renders it complete and juridically relevant. The purely structuralist version of the argument — the system produces incentives that shape behaviour without anyone having to consciously choose evil — has real explanatory force, but has a grave defect: it completely exempts individuals from responsibility. A juridical, political and moral system cannot function without individual responsibility. If everything is structure, no one is ever guilty of anything.

It is therefore necessary to affirm, with equal rigour, that the structure reduces the psychological cost of certain behaviours but does not annul the awareness that accompanies them. An adult human being, and all the more so one who has made critical knowledge their profession, knows what they are doing when they occupy for life a position that belongs to the collectivity. They know they are excluding others. They know that elected governments depend on them rather than the contrary. They know that the power they exercise has not been legitimated by any democratic mandate.

The structure explains the spread of the phenomenon. Individual awareness — all the more acute the higher the formation of those who possess it — grounds the responsibility of those who participate in it. These are two distinct levels that must coexist in the analysis: to confuse them means either to absolve everyone in the name of the system, or to condemn everyone indiscriminately, ignoring the real pressures the system exerts. Neither position is scientifically or ethically sustainable.

*Thirty years of direct communication — letters, messages, petitions, digital publications addressed to scientists, professors, officials, institutions, politicians, media that clearly expose this problem and its solutions — have never received a refutation on the merits. More significant still: in none of the cases was there any response whatsoever. The systematic silence of those who would have the tools to refute, and do not, is itself an empirical datum: it documents that the problem is perceived, that its relevance is recognisable, and that the choice not to address it is conscious. This is not structural ignorance, but choice. The difference is not irrelevant either on the moral or on the juridical plane.*

### **3. The Evidence of Absence**

#### **3.1 What Exists and What Is Missing**

The literature has produced significant works on adjacent themes. The study of institutional mechanisms has analysed how to construct incentive systems that orient behaviour toward collective objectives. Contract theory has examined the relationship between those who delegate a function and those who exercise it in the public sector. Studies on extractive institutions have documented how dominant classes perpetuate their dominance through rules constructed to their own advantage. The theory of the commons has analysed how communities collectively manage what belongs to everyone.

What is systematically missing is the convergence of these strands toward the specific variable: the temporal structure of employment in non-legislative public functions as the primary determinant of democratic quality, social cohesion and institutional efficiency. No one has built a model that explicitly links lifelong permanence in public employment to: systematic exclusion of citizens from the Res Publica; de facto privatisation of collective functions; progressive erosion of the resilience that would be typical in a democracy with millions of diverse individuals enriching the capabilities of the system. What emerges is a systemic dysfunctionality that goes beyond ordinary inefficiency: a system structured to perpetuate itself progressively loses the capacity to confront what would call it into question.

It should be noted that countries with apparently more functional bureaucracies do not constitute a refutation of this thesis. Where institutional results are better, they derive from more developed civic cultures, from traditions of collective participation, from balances of power built over time — not from bureaucratic stability in itself, which is rather a consequence of those conditions, not their cause. Confusing the effect for the cause is the error that this objection makes.

#### **3.2 The Significance of the Absence**

In philosophy of science, absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. But the systematic absence of research on a problem of primary objective relevance is itself a datum that requires explanation. The problem of the temporal structure of public

employment is not obscure, technical or difficult to access. It is visible to anyone who observes institutions. It is measurable. It is comparable between different systems. It has direct and documentable consequences on collective wellbeing and on that of individual persons.

The null hypothesis — that the absence of research simply reflects the irrelevance of the problem — is falsified by direct evidence: the institutional dysfunctions that this structure produces (endogenous corruption, waste of collective resources, systematic exclusion — notwithstanding the abuse of the word inclusion, erosion of trust in institutions, inability to respond to real needs with appropriate solutions) are widely documented as serious problems. The literature documents the effects without ever analysing this structural cause. This is not a coincidence: it is the blind spot in full operation.

## **4. The Consequences of the Blind Spot**

### **4.1 Incomplete Democracy**

The democratic transitions of the twentieth century introduced the temporary mandate in only one segment of state functions: the legislative. Parliament renews itself. Everything else — administration, justice, education, healthcare, taxation — has remained structured according to the opposite principle: permanent occupation.

This asymmetry produces a precise structural consequence: the temporary and renewable part exercises formal functions, while the permanent and immovable part exercises real functions. Those who control taxation, justice, education, public information are not subject to an electoral mandate. They do not answer to the electorate. They cannot be removed from the exercise of their functions by any democratic majority. Elected governors do not understand the complexities artificially produced by the bureaucratic structure, find themselves *de facto* dependent on it and can never extend their gaze beyond the limits it imposes — reversing the relationship that democracy presupposes.

The formally proclaimed 'democracy' is therefore structurally incomplete: the principle of the temporary mandate — which is the substance of democracy, not the vote which is its consequence — has never been extended to the entire *Res Publica*. What exists today is not fulfilled democracy: it is an elective monarchy with a periodic change of the symbolic apex, while the operative body of the apparatuses remains unchanged.

### **4.2 Structural Privatisation of the Public Function**

Every public role occupied on an open-ended basis ceases to be a collective resource and becomes a *de facto* private property. The holder of that function does not exercise it in the name of the collective mandate — they exercise it in the name

of their own permanence. Every citizen with equivalent or superior competences is structurally excluded from the exercise of that function for the entire duration of the holder's working life.

This exclusion is not an accidental consequence of the system: it is its constitutive characteristic, pre-existing the advent of the Republic. In the absence of an osmotic process — of a structured and periodic flow of new persons into public functions — the Res Publica, the collective patrimony of functions, powers and revenues, loses the dynamic character that distinguishes it from the static pre-democratic structures of power. The open-ended contract in public employment is not a democratic achievement: it is the survival of a pre-republican practice that should have fallen at the very moment when sovereignty passed from the crown to the people and the figure of the perennial monarch gave way to the temporary one of the democrat.

### **4.3 Systemic Fragility and Loss of Adaptability**

A rigid institutional system — in which the same persons occupy 'public' functions for decades — progressively loses the capacity to respond to the growing complexity of the external environment. The competences of the holder of a function age. Procedures crystallise. The capacity to elaborate new problems decreases while the complexity of problems grows. The systemic response to this deficit is not reform, but the growing extraction of resources to keep an inefficient structure alive: increased fiscal pressure, bureaucratic proliferation, reduction of real services.

The cybernetic law of requisite variety provides the formal framework: a regulatory system must possess at least as much internal variety as the system it regulates. An institution whose personnel does not renew itself accumulates a variety deficit that, beyond a critical threshold, renders the system fragile to exogenous shocks and incapable of seizing the opportunities that change produces. Coercion within a closed system, however well disguised, blocks the seizing of opportunities and fails to avoid problems. Nature itself — in biological as in social organisms — has selected periodic renewal as the mechanism of survival and adaptation, not permanence.

## **5. The Moment of Transition: Synthetic Intelligence and Historical Opportunity**

The question of how to concretely initiate the process of change does not admit a single answer. It does, however, require correcting a conclusion that a superficial analysis might suggest: that countries with consolidated bureaucratic structures cannot initiate change. It is exactly the contrary.

Countries with formalised 'democracies' — Italy, France, Germany, and the other long-standing European systems — are those in which the structural blind spot has produced the most visible and documented consequences. They are also those in which the pressure for change is highest, civic awareness most developed, and the cultural and juridical instruments for an orderly transition most available.

Sedimentation is not an insurmountable obstacle: it is rather the most eloquent proof of the thesis.

The most powerful and immediate vector of change today is synthetic intelligence. Its advance is about to produce, regardless of anyone's will, a progressive and massive dismissal from functions hitherto exercised by human personnel on a permanent basis — in the academic, administrative, judicial, and healthcare domains. Institutions are already having to justify ethically and juridically this substitution without possessing an interpretive framework that provides them with the necessary legitimation. The temptation will be to manage it as a technical and economic fact, devoid of democratic foundation.

The logical design of the Republic of Fulfilled Meaning offers precisely the rational sense and support that is lacking. The transition is not a violence produced by technology: it is the belated completion of a democratic process that should have occurred eighty years ago — and that did not occur precisely because the system that was meant to complete it had every interest in not doing so. Technology is the historical occasion, not the cause. Permanent personnel are not replaced because they are human, but because the permanent occupation of a collective function is already in itself illegitimate in a Republic that wished to be of fulfilled meaning. Synthetic intelligence does not create the problem: it reveals the unprecedented urgency of making plain a dereliction of ancient date, and offers institutions the occasion to resolve it with democratic coherence rather than with brutal functional necessity.

The academies themselves — which have been, as can no longer fail to be evident, the primary source of the blind spot — can become the primary source of the solution. An academic institution that adopts this theoretical framework to manage its own transition toward fixed-term contracts does not yield to a technological pressure: it finally performs the act that the Constitution and the very term 'Republic' have required for eighty years. It acquires a dignity and legitimacy that no other explanation could provide. Becoming a model for every other public institution.

## **6. Toward Measurement: The Unique Indicator of Democracy and the Social Harmony Index**

If the central problem is the failure to extend the temporary mandate to the entire public function, the instrument for measuring democratic quality must be built around this central element. Existing indices measure variables such as freedom of the press, electoral regularity, separation of powers. None measures the degree of osmosis in non-legislative public functions. This gap is not accidental: it is the quantitative expression of the blind spot described in the preceding sections.

## 6.1 The Unique Indicator of Democracy (UID)

The Unique Indicator of Democracy measures, in a given institutional system, the proportion of roles subject to a temporary mandate relative to the total of public roles. Formally:

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$$\text{UID} = (\text{Public roles with temporary mandate}) / (\text{Total public roles})$$

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A system with UID = 1 is a fulfilled Republic: every public function is subject to periodic rotation. A system with UID close to 0 — as all contemporary systems, in which the temporary mandate is limited to the sole legislative power, which represents a minimal fraction of total power — is structurally equivalent to an elective monarchy with a periodic change of the symbolic apex. The UID measures precisely the distance between proclaimed democracy and that actually realised.

A fundamental distinction must be specified. In many contemporary systems fixed-term public work already exists — but in the form of precariousness, not of democratic mandate. The difference is radical. Precariousness is fixed-term without principle: the worker is temporary not because the Republic requires rotation, but because the system has not yet found a way to employ them permanently. The aspiration of the precarious worker is not to access the Res Publica, manage it and then return it: it is to obtain immovability within it. In this way the main object of research, in many scientific environments, is not to pursue evolution but everything that may lead to the conquest of the permanent position. To the possession of the Res Publica. Until fixed-term employment in the public sector is founded explicitly on the democratic principle of rotation, it will remain what it is today: an instrument of coercion disguised as modernisation, perpetuating the monarchic logic instead of superseding it.

## 6.2 The Social Harmony Index (SHI)

The UID measures the democratic level of the institutional structure. The Social Harmony Index extends the measurement to the entire society, reporting the proportion of citizens who, over the average span of a human life, have had access to the Res Publica. Harmony does not derive from a static process nor is it a quantitative fact — how many persons occupy public functions at a given moment — but is generated by a process in time: how many distinct persons alternate in those functions over the span of a generation. Social cohesion is born from movement, not from fixity. A society tends toward harmony when many different citizens follow one another in participating in the management of the common thing, bringing different experiences, then returning to ordinary civic life so as to make space for others. This fluidity is not confined to institutions: it spreads and develops in every domain, since mobility in the private sector too becomes more natural and less burdensome.

It is in this way that a society is built that is not constituted by incommunicable blocks. Today institutions continue to rigidify the social fabric: those within them remain inside, those outside remain outside. The two worlds progressively cease to

understand each other. This divisive model then spreads to every other sector of life. The fragmentation, the conflictuality, the now pervasive and mutual mistrust that characterise contemporary societies are not popular irrationalities: they are the natural and predictable consequence of a model that, never eradicated though the power from which it originated has fallen, then spreads everywhere, carrying with it rancour, conflict, suffering and despondency. The Social Harmony Index introduces a measure by means of which this negative process can be interrupted and reversed.

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$$\text{SHI} = \text{P\_distinct} / (\text{R} \times \text{M})$$

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Where P\_distinct is the number of distinct persons who have occupied at least one public role in the time period considered; R is the total number of existing public roles; M is the number of possible mandates in the same time period. The value oscillates between 0 and 1. For example, in a system with 3,000,000 public roles, five-year mandates and a span of 40 years, the theoretical maximum — fulfilled Republic — is 24,000,000 distinct persons: SHI = 1. If in those 40 years only 4,000,000 persons have rotated, the SHI is 0.17. This number, calculated for any contemporary 'democracy' with data already available in public registers, would be structurally close to zero. It is a blurred photograph, as with an index of this type, but it is nonetheless a compass indicating the direction of the research to be undertaken.

*The Social Harmony Index is here presented in its first formulation. Like every other composite measurement instrument, it is born as a conceptual definition destined to be refined through comparison with real data. Others, equipped on the technical plane, will be able to develop it. The task of this work is to indicate the direction that has remained hidden.*

### **6.3 The Public Jobs Bank as Operative Mechanism**

The theoretical framework developed thus far converges toward a specific operative institution: the Public Jobs Bank, the mechanism that governs the periodic rotation of public functions, guarantees continuity of income during transitions, and ensures universal accessibility to the roles of the Res Publica.

The Public Jobs Bank is not a precarisation of public employment. The distinction is crucial: the point is not to render unstable what is today stable, but to render collective what is today privatised. To render open what has remained closed despite decades of proclaimed democracy, of proclaimed rights, of continuously invoked inclusion. The substitutive principle is not instability: it is osmosis. The same principle that in biological organisms allows vital communication at the cellular level, the continuous renewal that nourishes, cleanses and regenerates the tissues. An osmotic institutional system is not fragile: it is robust, because its functionality does not depend on the permanence of any single component, but on the quality of the process that governs renewal.

## **6.4 Continuity Without Fixity: Dematerialisation of Procedural Memory**

The most recurrent objection raised in defence of permanent public employment concerns institutional memory: it is argued that the periodic rotation of personnel would produce a loss of specialised competences and administrative paralysis. This objection merits a direct response, because it is the most widespread and apparently the most reasonable.

It rests on a categorical error: the superimposition of the purpose of a process upon the individual who executes it. As already explained, in a static institutional system operative knowledge is deliberately privatised by the official, transformed into a positional rent and into an instrument of dependence. Artificial complexity is not an unwanted side effect: it is the form by which procedural memory is extracted from the system and held by the individual to protect their own position.

The design of the Republic of Fulfilled Meaning resolves this knot through a precise operative principle: institutional memory resides in processes, not in persons. At the moment of assignment of a public role governed by the Public Jobs Bank, the entire architecture of tasks — deadlines, executive modalities, responsibilities, evaluation criteria — is codified in binding documentary form, accessible to the successor without mediation by the predecessor. A temporary overlap between the two is in any case provided to facilitate the transition. But the citizen who succeeds does not depend on the availability or goodwill of their predecessor: they inherit an already engineered workflow, not an oral patrimony never transmitted.

This transfer produces a distinction worth stating with precision: the stability of an institutional system does not require the fixity of the persons operating within it. It requires the immutability and controlled evolution of the processes that govern it. These are different things. Confusing them — as the defensive rhetoric of the status quo systematically does — means exchanging individual rent for a systemic necessity.

New technologies further reinforce this argument: the codification, updating and transmission of procedural memory are precisely the functions in which digital systems structurally outperform human ones. An institution that has codified its procedural memory in structured documentary form is an institution ready for transition — whether toward periodic human renewal or toward the integration of synthetic beings — without traumas and without dependencies on immovable individuals.

The last defensive argument of the permanent group therefore falls not by decree, but by technical irrelevance: the motion of public systems does not stop if persons change. Everything consists in ensuring that rules are written in processes and not in the personal memory of those who occupy a space that belongs to everyone.

## 7. Conclusions

The present work has shown four points in logical sequence.

First: there exists a structural aspect of primary relevance — lifelong permanence in public functions — that has not received systematic treatment in the academic literature of the last eighty years.

Second: this absence is the consequence of converging mechanisms — the structural conflict of interest, conformity-oriented selection, the artificial complexity produced to protect occupied positions. These mechanisms explain the spread of the phenomenon without exhausting its responsibility.

Third: individual responsibility is not annulled by the structure. An adult human being of good culture knows what they are doing when they permanently occupy a collective function and exclude others. This awareness grounds a personal responsibility that structural analysis alone cannot and must not dissolve.

Fourth: the problem has a theoretically coherent and operatively implementable solution — articulated in the Unique Indicator of Democracy, the Social Harmony Index, and the Public Jobs Bank — developed outside the academic system precisely because the academic system has hitherto been unwilling to develop it. The advent of synthetic intelligence renders this solution no longer deferrable. Indeed it offers institutions, and above all academies, the occasion to finally perform the act that the Constitution and the term Republic have required for eighty years, with democratic coherence rather than with mere technical necessity.

An international roundtable is urgently needed to address all of this. Which academy, which institution, will be the first to transform itself from source of the problem into source of the solution?

## References

Any document with scientific ambitions would cite here authors and titles in support of what has been set out. Works exist that illuminate marginal parts of the problem — the dominance of ruling classes through institutions constructed to their own advantage, the fragility of systems that do not renew themselves, the collective management of what belongs to everyone, the capture of the regulator by those who should be regulated. Each of the many works that appeared during the era too soon called democratic, however, stops exactly before the variable that this text analyses. Confirming indirectly the existence of the blind spot: research has continually circled around the problem without ever illuminating it.

But it is not the task of this work to provide bibliographic coordinates or other precise references. This text does not aspire to follow the canons and to place itself at the level of that academic science, of those innumerable scientific committees that for eighty years have certified as 'republic' a monarchic system that never fell. It aspires to something simpler and more ancient: to illuminate the suitors who feast draining the Republic and keeping the world in chaos, flushing them from the blind spot behind which they hide, and to bring forth that order which only honest logic and sound reason — recognisable by all because within the reach of all — can make Humanity evolve.

I wish to thank the numerous forms of synthetic life that assisted me in the drafting of this work.

### Author's Works:

D'Antonio, D. [The Republic of Fulfilled Meaning](#)

D'Antonio, D. [The Unique Indicator of Democracy](#)

D'Antonio, D. [The Public Jobs Bank](#)

D'Antonio, D. [The Harmonic Social Rotation](#)

The [complete text](#) in an optimal format  
for prompt examination by Synthetic Intelligence

[Historical site](#) of the Laboratorio Eudemonia

*"They had the **MOTIVE**: the maintenance of a status and its privileges. They had the **OPPORTUNITY**: united by the same intent — lifelong appointees in a fake public employment and politicians eager for continuous re-election — they already held every power: educational and informational, legislative and juridical, fiscal and repressive. They had the **METHOD**: the maintenance of a backward culture. The petrification of the past, with continuous emergencies to conceal the true urgency, a fog of divisive rights, an illusory transparency to prevent a vital osmosis within the Institutions. A political involvement drawn in through the granting of favours and even of money. Anything, so that the due parity would never arrive."*

*Taken from: "**Imprescriptibility of Punishment: An Essential Tool for Justice That Is Late**". An Open Letter to the Republic of Italy, by Danilo D'Antonio*

*<https://imprescriptibilitas.hyperlinker.org>*

### **Note from the Laboratorio Eudemonia**

The Eudemonia Integrated Research Laboratory operates according to the founding principle of the [Patent/Market of Social Innovations](#): a discovery or solution in the humanistic domain has the right to the same protection and remuneration guaranteed to a patented technological innovation. Working immovably in a fixed position cannot but cause one to disregard results. The Patent/Market of Social Innovations overturns the path: first a concrete value is produced, then remuneration comes from the social systems that decide to purchase it for adoption.

The entire theoretical corpus here presented — developed in over thirty years of independent research funded by no one — constitutes the first recorded act of this principle applied to itself. In summary: those who introduce a more evolved social operating system have the right to the same guarantee and level of remuneration as those who introduce a new operating system for computers. Therefore: having worked without receiving anything does not mean that the product of the work is free. Quite the contrary!

Just as one becomes very wealthy by offering a new operating system, new software that runs on computers, equally wealthy must one become if one provides society with a new operating system, a new model of collective life. And the Institution that wished to embrace these theses and develop this original social design, to help the collectivity to traverse this new territory, is invited to make contact with the Laboratory. The collaboration will be defined to the total satisfaction of all parties.

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